Return migration of foreign students andthe choice of non-resident tuition fees

The paper presents a model of student migration in order to determine the optimal choice of non-resident tuition fees in a host country of higher education. Students with rational expectations consider a potential return migration in their first-round decision whether to study abroad, so that demand for the higher education system in the host country and optimal non-resident tuition fees depend on the stay rates of foreign-born graduates.A decline in stay rates of foreign students is demonstrated to induce a cutback of tuition fees if the costs of education per student are not too high. The fact that students take into account the possibility of return migration after graduation in their first-stage location decision in combination with rational expectations finally drives this result.tuition fees, oversea students, return migration, rational expectations, brain drain, preference for foreign lifestyle

Are Union Members Happy Workers after All? Evidence from Eastern and Western European Labor Markets

Based on data from the European Values Study (EVS), we compare the determinants of job satisfaction and the impact of union membership in Eastern and Western European labor markets. Correcting our regressions for union endogeneity and controlling for individual characteristics, values and beliefs, and important aspects of a job, we find a positive association between unionization and job satisfaction. This is contrary to the dominant view of the impact of unionization on job satisfaction suggesting that there is a strong, negative relationship between the two variables. We also uncover distinct attitudinal differences between Eastern and Western European employees, highlighting persistent influences of former communist labor relations.Unions; job satisfaction; EVS

Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality country, the tuition fees, and the quality and tuition fee differential between the countries increase with the income prospects in ROW and the number of international students. Higher stay rates of foreign students lead to more ambiguous results. In particular, an increase in educational quality can be accompanied by a decline in tuition fees. Furthermore, international competition for students can give rise to a brain gain in ROW.Higher education; student mobility; vertical quality dierentiation; return migration; brain gain

Competition for the International Pool of Talents : Education Policy with Student Mobility

The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their education systems in equilibrium. While one country offers high education quality at high charges for students - the most talented ones study in this country - the other one provides lower quality and charges lower tuition fees. The regional quality-differentiation increases with the size of the international pool of talents, with the stay rate of foreign students in the host countries upon graduation and with the degree of development of the sending countries of foreign students. Compared to the welfare-maximizing education-policy, the decentralized solution is likely to imply an inefficient allocation of foreign students to the two host countries, as well as an inefficient quality differentiation.higher education, student mobility, vertical quality differentiation, return migration

Pensions, Education and Life Expectancy

In a two-period model with agent heterogeneity we analyze a pension reform toward a stronger link between contributions and benefits (as recently observed in several countries) in a pension system with a Bismarckian and a Beveridgian component. We show that such a policy change reduces the educational level in an economy. The life expectancy differential between skilled and unskilled individuals drives this result. Furthermore, we investigate the consequences on the intragenerational redistribution characteristics of the pension system – in the sense of the number of net-recipients relative to net-payers – as well as welfare effects.social security, education, life expectancy, pension reform, redistribution

A note on the magnetic spatial forcing of a ferrofluid layer

We report on the response of a thin layer of ferrofluid to a spatially modulated magnetic field. This field is generated by means of a constant current in a special arrangement of aluminum wires. The full surface profile of the liquid layer is recorded by means of the absorption of X-rays. The outcome is analyzed particularly with regard to the magnetic self focusing effect under a deformable fluid layer

A Note on Brain Gain and Brain Drain: Permanent Migration and Education Policy

In this note, we present a novel channel for a brain gain. Students from a developing country study in a developed host country. A higher permanent migration probability of these students appears to be a brain drain for the developing country in the first place. However, it induces the host country to improve its education quality, as a larger share of the generated benefits accrue in this host country. A higher education quality raises in turn the human capital of the returning students. As long as the permanent migration probability is not too large, this positive effect causes both aggregate and per-capita human capital to increase in the developing country. Thus, a brain gain occurs.brain gain, education policy, human capital, return migration